They kicked the shit out of Egypt several times. I know it was the Yom Kippur War in '73 where they had the entire Egyptian Third Army encircled and cut off on the Sinai. It took some heavy pressure from Kissinger to save the Egyptians from annihilation.
That's the IDF PR version, the reality is much more complicated and not as wonderful-sounding for the Israelis.
In 1967 the Israelis jumped first and not surprisingly gained a huge advantage by declaring war via strike jets already inbound on their first targets - Egyptian airfields in the Sinai - as soon as they crossed the border. The IDF gained air dominance and the Arabs were pretty screwed at that point, but on the other hand the Israeli military pretty much exhausted its capabilities in getting to the Canal. Any idea of going on to Cairo was basically crazy talk and they knew it.
1973 was a different situation and was as much a proxy war between us and the USSR as it was an Arab-Israeli event. This time the Egyptians had spent a great deal of effort turning their Army into a more Western form, i.e. small unit leadership more on the NATO model rather than the horde-of-armed-rabble model. The Egyptians prepared a surprise attack of their own aimed at regaining the Canal, under the protection of a high-speed integrated air defense system, the latest tech the Soviets had to offer, that inflicted very heavy losses on the Israeli air force when it tried to interfere.
The Egyptian Army had a very sound plan with the limited strategic objective of just regaining control of the Canal without moving out of their air defense umbrella, unfortunately for them Sadat interfered with the whole thing because the Syrians, who did not have such an improved army and were morons to boot, got into major trouble and pleaded for him to launch further attacks to take the heat off them. The Egyptian military leaders knew it wouldn't end well but Sadat gave them no choice, still the whole thing would have probably ended there on the Egyptian front with the Egyptian owning the Canal again and massive losses on both sides, a stalemate but an improvement in the situation for Egypt.
However at that point the Big Powers got involved. We shipped about every TOW in Europe and an awful lot of the ready tank ammo and spare parts stocks to Israel in a massive airlift. While it rendered the US Army in Europe temporarily combat ineffective, it enabled the IDF to launch their big counterattack through Chinese Farm, which could never have happened without the airlift.
It succeeded a little too well because our pals, the IDF, kept ignoring stop lines their own government had agreed to in Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy, which was starting to make us look like lying bastards, and the Soviets (Who were hardly ignorant of our role in bankrolling the counteroffensive) became highly unamused with Sharon's antics and our role in supporting them, so they put their airborne divisions on immediate alert to deploy and sort out the Canal. Soviet divisions were smaller than ours, but eight of theirs versus one of ours (With no TOWs left) didn't sound like good odds.
The US military went on worldwide alert in its turn, but since the US ammo supply in Europe had been raped already, pushing anything from our side was your basic mother of all bad ideas, and enough bitchslaps finally made their way down the Israeli chain of command to get the field forces to observe the halt lines. Just in time, because Ari Sharon's disregard of the agreed halt lines came closer to plunging us into war with the USSR than anything but the Cuban Missile Crisis.
So, although the IDF ended things on an up note on the Sinai front, and both sides acquitted themselves fairly well (The Egyptians better than anyone in the West expected, the Israelis not really quite as well as expected) the great power meddling in the prep, middle, and end of the hostilities seriously interferes with any attempt to draw big lessons about the quality of the forces on either side.
