The premise presupposes itself, i.e. that decisions are based solely on material phenomenon ergo material phenomenon are the basis for all decisions.
The argument just claims that decisions, thoughts, beliefs, characteristics of a person, etc are included in prior states of the universe... perhaps those things are immaterial, and perhaps the universe includes immaterial things, or not.. it doesn't matter for the purposes of the argument. One is free to argue against that premise, but that doesnt make it circular. Remember, for the type of will that Nietzsche speaks of, a BFA (basically free action) must be possible. BFA's are a fundamental concept in libertarian/contra-causal/non-deterministic theories of free-will.
BFA (Basically Free Action) = A is a BFA for S at time t, iff (if and only if) the state of the universe prior to t, coupled with the laws of nature for that universe, are also consistent with S’s not A-ing at t. Or in other words, the prior state of the universe does not necessitate S’s performance of A at t, and is equally compatible with S’s not (~) A-ing at t.
BFA's are necessary for libertarian free-will. But since all characteristics and components of a person X are prior states of the universe, then nothing in a person can account for the choices that they make. So they are matters of luck.
It also hides itself from falsifiability.
Well, it is hard to establish that all those those things in premise 4 are actually prior states of the universe that determine one's choices, sure.. though I'm not sure how falsible or non-falsible it is. But the same objection easily applies to belief in supernatural or contra-casual free will, in spades. So if its a problem for me, its a problem for you (and Nietzsche) too.
In my supposition of the twin sisters and their wayward husbands the goal posts will forever be further removed the more their prior conditions are said to resemble each other until, at last, it will be claimed the flapping of butterfly wings on different continents was indeed the determining factor.
So what? Maybe it was flapping wings of a butterfly - the point of the argument remains, that nothing within the twins accounts for their differing choices. Therefore, there choices were a matter of luck.
Then there's this:
The proposition assumes all these things are not acts of will in and of themselves as if they are merely phenomenon of the universe such as the sun flaring at a given moment. Again, reinforcing the question begging aspect of the formulation.
Well, in the case that all these things are not included in prior states of the universe, and could obtain or not obtain, given the same initial conditions of the universe, then the argument easily applies to them as well. So the problem just gets multiplied. All those things, not just will, are a matter of luck, and nothing within the agent accounts for their actual state.
I have literally slapped people making such arguments. I have even kicked one person in the shin hard enough to send him hobbling away.
I wish I could meet you some day. Are you coming to Colorado any time soon?
Heh - well, you should re-think the snarky accusations - I don't think they hold water. And yea, I got to CO frequently, to snowboard, and to visit family - and there's a good chance I'll end up living there, someday... maybe I'll get shin guards first.