Nietzsche, the Will and the Bible

[MrsSmith]

No MrsSmith, you miss the true dichotomy - its not "robots" or "free will" - its "there are reasons for your choices" (determinism), or "there are no reasons for your choices" (randomness).

In either case, free-will of you think of it, is nowhere to be seen.   Its off somewhere in the same realm where square circles reside

And actually, for what its worth, that view isnt necessarily incompatible with Christianity.. as Cavlinists are determinists, and basically agree with the above dichotomy.   

There are definitely reasons for my choices, my reasons.   I think them through, and then use my free will to choose what I prefer, or what I've decided is most responsible.  This is a normal procedure for mature humans, though not often observed in adolescent or other immature humans.  I'm sure you'll find this out someday.   

[rubliw]

There are definitely reasons for my choices, my reasons.  I think them through, and then use my free will to choose what I prefer, or what I've decided is most responsible.

In other words, you follow your desires.... see premise #4 in the argument I included in this thread:

(4) Joe’s (or MrsSmith's) personality, thoughts, desires, hopes, beliefs, character traits, dispositions etc. are part of the state of the universe prior to t.


Here are the following premises and conclusions, for your convenience:

(5) So in the two possible universes under consideration, there is nothing in Joe (or MrsSmith) (i.e. in his (her) personality or mind) that is different.
(6) This implies that nothing in Joe (MrsSmith) accounts for the difference between his (her) performing A in one universe and not performing A in the other universe.
(7) Which is to say: whether A or ~A obtains is strictly a matter of present luck.

You have failed to address 5, 6 and 7.. so you either must offer some challenges to them, or you must concede that your choices are either causally determined, or a matter of luck.

[rubliw]

Are you asserting that all people, given the exact same predicate set of factors for a given event at a given time will all--without variance--make the same judgment?

Sort of.  I do think what you say above is true.   But in the event that it's not... in the event that both A and ~A could obtain given identical prior states of the universe, then what we normally call "choices" are really just matters of luck... and they have absolutely nothing to do with the agent... definitely, not the stuff moral responsibility is made of.

Or does the theory attempt to become lost in the sauce; i.e. different personal upbringing, different economic factors, a butterfly flapping its wings in the Congo instead of SE Asia?

Well, all those things would mean that there are differing prior states of the universe... so there's no reason to think they would cause the same choices.

[MrsSmith]

In other words, you follow your desires.... see premise #4 in the argument I included in this thread:

(4) Joe’s (or MrsSmith's) personality, thoughts, desires, hopes, beliefs, character traits, dispositions etc. are part of the state of the universe prior to t.


Here are the following premises and conclusions, for your convenience:

(5) So in the two possible universes under consideration, there is nothing in Joe (or MrsSmith) (i.e. in his (her) personality or mind) that is different.
(6) This implies that nothing in Joe (MrsSmith) accounts for the difference between his (her) performing A in one universe and not performing A in the other universe.
(7) Which is to say: whether A or ~A obtains is strictly a matter of present luck.

You have failed to address 5, 6 and 7.. so you either must offer some challenges to them, or you must concede that your choices are either causally determined, or a matter of luck.

Reading comprehension again, wil.  Even the snip you repeated said:

Quote from: MrsSmith on May 17, 2011, 08:41:37 pm
There are definitely reasons for my choices, my reasons.  I think them through, and then use my free will to choose what I prefer, or what I've decided is most responsible.

 So, no, I do not "follow my desires" in all choices.  Sometimes I choose to do what I desire, but most of the time I choose to do what is responsible instead of what I'd really prefer.  They are not causally determined or a matter of luck, they are rationally determined.  (As you constantly present yourself as a rational thinker, I'm surprised that you evidently act without any rational basis for your actions!  Tsk, tsk...)  This is how free will works...and why obedience to God is not forced, but rather chosen.

Though you are correct that I have not responded to your imaginary second universe in which an imaginary MrsSmith may choose to read more often and do less work.  I guess you can imagine that universe in any way you choose, since it exists only in your head.  (You may feel free to imagine that MrsSmith as hugely fat, also, because if I were not responsible and rational, I would certainly be munching chocolate and other sweets while I read.)  In the real universe, things don't work according to your suppositions.  That's what happens when the one supposing just happens not to be God.  Sorry!  

As it is, God sets the standard for the real universe, and He grants us all the ability to make our own choices...and we retain the moral responsibility for those choices even if we imagine a universe in which we chose differently.  I will grant that philosophers have been trying forever to find some way to complicate that fact in order to excuse their own moral failings, but they are also not in charge of the universe and cannot grant themselves forgiveness by imagining that God built this place with loopholes the way the government built the tax code.  Terribly sorry!  But you know, reality is rational, so there is just no escaping the fact that we own our actions and choices.    

[SSG Snuggle Bunny]

Sort of.  I do think what you say above is true.   But in the event that it's not... in the event that both A and ~A could obtain given identical prior states of the universe, then what we normally call "choices" are really just matters of luck... and they have absolutely nothing to do with the agent... definitely, not the stuff moral responsibility is made of.

Suppose there were twin sisters of equal religious temperament who both married around the same age to men of equal status and each had the same number of children of roughly the same ages and both discovered after a decade of marriage their respective husbands were involved in adulterous affairs. One sister immediately sought divorce while the other went to counseling with her husband.

[rubliw]

Reading comprehension again, wil.  Even the snip you repeated said:

So, no, I do not "follow my desires" in all choices.  Sometimes I choose to do what I desire, but most of the time I choose to do what is responsible instead of what I'd really prefer.  They are not causally determined or a matter of luck, they are rationally determined.

Well, lets put aside for a moment the fact that the desire to do what is responsible, over what would be most pleasurable to you in the moment, is, in fact, a desire also...  my reading comprehension is just fine.   You need to actually pay attention to the argument, because you just agreed with with, without realizing it, and while trying hard not too (heh) - here's premise (4) (for a third time):

(4) Joe’s (or MrsSmith's) personality, thoughts, desires, hopes, beliefs, character traits, dispositions etc. are part of the state of the universe prior to t.

You've stated that your choices are determined by rational deliberation, which means that your choices are determined by prior states of the universe.  

Though you are correct that I have not responded to your imaginary second universe in which an imaginary MrsSmith may choose to read more often and do less work.  I guess you can imagine that universe in any way you choose, since it exists only in your head.  (You may feel free to imagine that MrsSmith as hugely fat, also, because if I were not responsible and rational, I would certainly be munching chocolate and other sweets while I read.)  In the real universe, things don't work according to your suppositions.  That's what happens when the one supposing just happens not to be God.  Sorry!  

Oh goodness. You actually need to use the concept of "possible worlds" in order to even describe what "free will" is, in the sense that you mean.  Part and parcel of "free will" is that one could have chosen differently (A or ~A).   Poking fun at the concept of "possible worlds" leaves you with no conceptual ground to even define the term you are trying to defend....

[rubliw]

Suppose there were twin sisters of equal religious temperament who both married around the same age to men of equal status and each had the same number of children of roughly the same ages and both discovered after a decade of marriage their respective husbands were involved in adulterous affairs. One sister immediately sought divorce while the other went to counseling with her husband.

Well, I would say their differing choices were the results of minor differences in prior conditions, even though many other prior conditions were very similar.   

[MrsSmith]

Well, lets put aside for a moment the fact that the desire to do what is responsible, over what would be most pleasurable to you in the moment, is, in fact, a desire also...  my reading comprehension is just fine.   You need to actually pay attention to the argument, because you just agreed with with, without realizing it, and while trying hard not too (heh) - here's premise (4) (for a third time):

(4) Joe’s (or MrsSmith's) personality, thoughts, desires, hopes, beliefs, character traits, dispositions etc. are part of the state of the universe prior to t.

You've stated that your choices are determined by rational deliberation, which means that your choices are determined by prior states of the universe.  

Oh goodness. You actually need to use the concept of "possible worlds" in order to even describe what "free will" is, in the sense that you mean.  Part and parcel of "free will" is that one could have chosen differently (A or ~A).   Poking fun at the concept of "possible worlds" leaves you with no conceptual ground to even define the term you are trying to defend....

Yes, of course, I must have an imaginary universe in which the "Other MrsSmith" makes the opposite of my every choice before my choices are my own responsibility.  If I don't imagine this imaginary universe, then I am a robot with no choice in anything.  Right.       Well, thanks for the imaginary explanation, but I think I'll just stay in reality, ok?  

[rubliw]

Yes, of course, I must have an imaginary universe in which the "Other MrsSmith" makes the opposite of my every choice before my choices are my own responsibility.

Free will, in the sense that you *want* to defend here, and of the sort discussed by the OP, as a fundamental, requires that your choices could be otherwise, and that it must actually possible for you to choose A, over not A, and vice versa.    So if there is no possible world where you choices could have been different, then yes - you are determinist, Mrs Smith.  Your "choices" are simply what must have been, not acts of free will.

[BattleHymn]

Mr Bunny,

Have you ever had the chance to read Mere Christianity?

[SSG Snuggle Bunny]

The premise presupposes itself, i.e. that decisions are based solely on material phenomenon ergo material phenomenon are the basis for all decisions.

That's question begging and as such it is an amateur error.

It also hides itself from falsifiability.

In my supposition of the twin sisters and their wayward husbands the goal posts will forever be further removed the more their prior conditions are said to resemble each other until, at last, it will be claimed the flapping of butterfly wings on different continents was indeed the determining factor.

Then there's this:

personality, thoughts, desires, hopes, beliefs, character traits, dispositions etc. are part of the state of the universe prior to t.

The proposition assumes all these things are not acts of will in and of themselves as if they are merely phenomenon of the universe such as the sun flaring at a given moment. Again, reinforcing the question begging aspect of the formulation.

I have literally slapped people making such arguments. I have even kicked one person in the shin hard enough to send him hobbling away.

I wish I could meet you some day. Are you coming to Colorado any time soon?

[rubliw]

The premise presupposes itself, i.e. that decisions are based solely on material phenomenon ergo material phenomenon are the basis for all decisions.

The argument just claims that decisions, thoughts, beliefs, characteristics of a person, etc are included in prior states of the universe... perhaps those things are immaterial, and perhaps the universe includes immaterial things, or not.. it doesn't matter for the purposes of the argument.  One is free to argue against that premise, but that doesnt make it circular.  Remember, for the type of will that Nietzsche speaks of, a BFA (basically free action) must be possible.  BFA's are a fundamental concept in libertarian/contra-causal/non-deterministic theories of free-will.  


BFA (Basically Free Action) = A is a BFA for S at time t, iff (if and only if) the state of the universe prior to t, coupled with the laws of nature for that universe, are also consistent with S’s not A-ing at t. Or in other words, the prior state of the universe does not necessitate S’s performance of A at t, and is equally compatible with S’s not (~) A-ing at t.


BFA's are necessary for libertarian free-will.  But since all characteristics and components of a person X are prior states of the universe, then nothing in a person can account for the choices that they make.  So they are matters of luck.

It also hides itself from falsifiability.

Well, it is hard to establish that all those those things in premise 4 are actually prior states of the universe that determine one's choices, sure.. though I'm not sure how falsible or non-falsible it is.  But the same objection easily applies to belief in supernatural or contra-casual free will, in spades.   So if its a problem for me, its a problem for you (and Nietzsche) too.

In my supposition of the twin sisters and their wayward husbands the goal posts will forever be further removed the more their prior conditions are said to resemble each other until, at last, it will be claimed the flapping of butterfly wings on different continents was indeed the determining factor.

So what?  Maybe it was flapping wings of a butterfly - the point of the argument remains, that nothing within the twins accounts for their differing choices.   Therefore, there choices were a matter of luck.

Then there's this:

The proposition assumes all these things are not acts of will in and of themselves as if they are merely phenomenon of the universe such as the sun flaring at a given moment. Again, reinforcing the question begging aspect of the formulation.

Well, in the case that all these things are not included in prior states of the universe, and could obtain or not obtain, given the same initial conditions of the universe, then the argument easily applies to them as well.  So the problem just gets multiplied.   All those things, not just will, are a matter of luck, and nothing within the agent accounts for their actual state.

I have literally slapped people making such arguments. I have even kicked one person in the shin hard enough to send him hobbling away.

I wish I could meet you some day. Are you coming to Colorado any time soon?

Heh - well, you should re-think the snarky accusations - I don't think they hold water.   And yea, I got to CO frequently, to snowboard, and to visit family - and there's a good chance I'll end up living there, someday... maybe I'll get shin guards first.

[SSG Snuggle Bunny]

Heh - well, you should re-think the snarky accusations - I don't think they hold water.

Oh wilbur.

Would someone else mind give junior here a clue-by-4.