The military talent has told him an Iraqi-style surge will not produce results, though they do want more force structure to hang onto the gains they've made and try to move it all forward. The biggest problem is the lack of even local government above a warlord level combined with an almost-invulnerable stronghold in Waziristan for the opposing forces. The warlords are not receptive to the idea of ironclad border control and patrollling, since smuggling contraband back and forth across that 'Border', ranging from carpets to opium, is their economic lifeblood. Therefore, such local government as there is has a stronger interest in keeping the border porous than they do in keeping the Taliban in check. The only thing that can turn it around is proving to them that allegience to a central government is more strongly in their interests than having access to their traditional smuggling routes.
The main problems with this are (1) the central government is weak and ineffective, largely incompetent really even when it's not being corrupt, so the benefits of allegience to it are miniscule compared to the threat of Taliban retribution (2) the central government is far away and the Taliban is just over the mountain in the Pakistani 'tribal areas,' and (3) a lot of the locals in SW Afghanistan don't exactly have a huge religious or ideological problem with the Taliban in the first place, and (4) there's really nothing positive we can offer them that would make up for what they lose with a tight border.